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David Schwartz’s terrific new book is subtitled John Mar-
shall and the 200-Year Odyssey of McCulloch v. Maryland.  But 
the book is about much more than Marshall and McCulloch.  It’s 
about the long struggle over the scope of national power.  Mar-
shall and McCulloch are characters in the story, but the story isn’t 
centrally about them.  Indeed, an important part of Schwartz’s 
narrative is that McCulloch has mattered relatively little in that 
struggle, except as a protean symbol. 
Schwartz sees the Constitution, properly understood, as war-
ranting a robust vision of national power.  The book’s studied am-
bivalence about the canonical status of McCulloch is partly a 
function of McCulloch’s capacity to retard as well as to advance 
national power, and thus to vindicate or repress the spirit of the 
Constitution, depending on who is using it.  In Schwartz’s view, 
McCulloch should be pressed into better service for its capacity 
to vindicate the best view of national power.  But better yet would 
be for that view to be vindicated in a way that did not rely on the 
backward-looking, court-centered, Marshall-celebrating frame-
work that is inextricably part of marching under the banner of 
McCulloch. 1 
The appearance of the book is an important moment in the 
development of a new wave of literature arguing for expansive 
conceptions of national power and, in particular, for skepticism 
toward the orthodox account of Congress as a legislature limited 
by enumerated powers.  Schwartz’s fellow travelers in that 
*  Theodore J. St. Antoine Collegiate Professor, The University of Michigan Law
School. 
1. See, e.g., DAVID S. SCHWARTZ, THE SPIRIT OF THE CONSTITUTION: JOHN 
MARSHALL AND THE 200-YEAR ODYSSEY OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND 254 (2019). 
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literature include John Mikhail,2 Robert Reinstein,3 and, well, 
me.4  This literature is not skeptical about federalism, and it 
doesn’t think that the national government should be able to act 
without limits.5  But it doubts that the Constitution’s enumeration 
of congressional powers can or should do the limiting work that 
orthodox constitutional-law discourse assigns to it.6  One of the 
targets of Schwartz’s book is accordingly the familiar idea that 
even without respect to affirmative limits like those articulated in 
the First Amendment, there are things that Congress lacks the au-
thority to do, because its enumerated powers are collectively less 
than a grant of general jurisdiction.  In a delightful coinage, 
Schwartz calls this idea “the mustbesomething rule,”7 because it 
holds that there must be something that Congress cannot do, even 
before we start talking about affirmative prohibitions.  (I have 
previously called this idea the “internal limits canon,”8 a term 
with a decent rationale but none of the pizazz of Schwartz’s label, 
so I may be switching.) 
Schwartz thinks the mustbesomething rule is ill-conceived, 
and he thinks McCulloch provides a framework for understanding 
why.  But he is not arguing that Marshall deliberately wrote an 
opinion that would authorize plenary federal power, nor anything 
close to it.  Instead, the book presents Marshall in McCulloch as 
having practiced “defensive nationalism,”9 aimed more at resist-
ing radical states’-rights views than at establishing a strong view 
of national power.  Seen in historical context, Schwartz writes, 
Marshall’s opinion is cautious on all of the truly explosive na-
tional-power issues of the day, notably slavery and internal 
2. See, e.g., John Mikhail, Is the Constitution a Power of Attorney or a Corporate
Charter? A Commentary on “A Great Power of Attorney”: Understanding the Fiduciary Con-
stitution by Gary Lawson and Guy Seidman, 17 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 407 (2019); John 
Mikhail, The Necessary and Proper Clauses, 102 GEO. L.J. 1045 (2014). 
3. See Robert J. Reinstein, The Aggregate and Implied Powers of the United States, 69
AM. U. L. REV. 3 (2019). 
4. See Richard Primus, The Limits of Enumeration, 124 YALE L.J. 576 (2014).
5. See, e.g., id. at 595-96.
6. See, e.g., id. at 596-98.
7. SCHWARTZ, supra note 1, at 242.
8. See, e.g., Primus, supra note 4, at 578 (emphasis added).
9. SCHWARTZ, supra note 1, at 5.  Schwartz credits Charles Hobson with the term.  Id.
at 17. 
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improvements.10  Much of the real action in nineteenth-century 
doctrines about federal power, in Schwartz’s view, was animated 
(and distorted) by judicial attempts to prevent Congress from be-
ing able to jeopardize chattel slavery in the states where it was 
practiced.  Not until after Emancipation (in particular, in the Legal 
Tender Cases11) was McCulloch presented as authority for a sig-
nificantly more robust nationalist vision,12 and Schwartz de-
scribes Justice Strong’s use of McCulloch in the Legal Tender 
Cases as an exercise in entrepreneurial misreading, one that made 
more of McCulloch than McCulloch made of itself.13  But the 
post-Civil War Court did not want to embrace McCulloch’s na-
tionalism fully, because that would have opened the door to ex-
pansive exercises of congressional power under the Reconstruc-
tion Amendments, which the Court was determined to avoid.14  
(Again, the specter haunting the construction of congressional 
power is the need to insulate racial hierarchy against potential re-
form; Schwartz’s thoroughly critical diagnosis of the Court here 
reads like cold water dumped on Larry Lessig’s recent rehabilita-
tive account in Fidelity and Constraint.15)  Only in the 1940s did 
Chief Justice Stone resuscitate the nationalist use of McCulloch, 
with assists from historians Thomas Reed Powell and Charles 
Beard.16  And this time, the Court was about to embrace congres-
sional efforts to combat racial discrimination, so the powerful 
force that blocked that possibility earlier in history was finally 
turned in the other direction, and the nationalist reading of 
McCulloch could have staying power. 
10. See, id. at 52-53, 58.
11. 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1870).
12. SCHWARTZ, supra note 1, at 143-44.
13. Id. at 148-49.
14. Id. at 155.
15. LAWRENCE LESSIG, FIDELITY AND CONSTRAINT: HOW THE SUPREME COURT HAS
READ THE CONSTITUTION 284-334 (2019) (presenting an account of Supreme Court juris-
prudence during and after Reconstruction on which the Court was not animated by an im-
pulse to preserve racial hierarchy).  Lessig’s account is partly indebted to the work of Pamela 
Brandwein.  See PAMELA BRANDWEIN, RETHINKING THE JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF 
RECONSTRUCTION (2011); Lessig, supra, at 284 (crediting Brandwein). 
16. SCHWARTZ, supra note 1, at 201-02.
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Schwartz is not the first to see the modern, nationalist view 
of McCulloch as a creature of the mid-twentieth century.17  But 
what follows in Schwartz’s telling is an argument that even after 
the New Deal, judicial doctrine has subordinated the robust na-
tional-power view that McCulloch might represent to a more re-
strictive view associated with a different Marshall decision: Gib-
bons v. Ogden.18  The key difference between the two 
frameworks, Schwartz explains, is the difference between associ-
ating Congress’s broad, post-New Deal legislative jurisdiction 
with the Necessary and Proper Clause (per McCulloch) and asso-
ciating it with the commerce power as such (per Gibbons).19  
Schwartz reads the modern Court from Wickard v. Filburn20 to 
Gonzales v. Raich21 as favoring the Gibbons paradigm.22  And 
that choice had bite, Schwartz says, in the greatest twenty-first 
century mustbesomething case: NFIB v. Sebelius.23  Chief Justice 
Roberts’s argument that a law creating (rather than regulating) 
commerce cannot be justified as necessary and proper for the ex-
ecution of an exercise of the commerce power makes sense, 
Schwartz argues, only if the scope of congressional power under 
the Necessary and Proper Clause is limited by the terms of what-
ever other power it is invoked to support—here, the commerce 
power.24  And that sort of transferred limitation would make sense 
on a Gibbons view, where the question is ultimately whether the 
commerce power gives Congress the authority at issue.  But on a 
robust McCulloch view, Congress is entitled to do things that are 
in no way regulations of commerce, so long as they are practically 
helpful for other things that are regulations of commerce.  Natu-
rally enough, Schwartz prefers the necessary-and-proper frame-
work, understood as the more expansive of the two because it 
overtly authorizes Congress to regulate things that are not com-
merce. 
17. For one earlier account, see Gerard N. Magliocca, A New Approach to Congres-
sional Power: Revisiting the Legal Tender Cases, 95 GEO. L.J. 119 (2006). 
18. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
19. SCHWARTZ, supra note 1, at 154-55 (drawing the distinction).
20. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
21. 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
22. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 1, at 226-34, 242-43.
23. 567 U.S. 519 (2012).
24. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 1, at 245.
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Schwartz’s careful teasing apart of the McCulloch and Gib-
bons strands of doctrine over time is one of the book’s excellent 
contributions to the literature.  The book makes a compelling case 
that McCulloch’s doctrine has been the more expansive frame-
work through most of history.  But to the extent that the project 
here is not just understanding the past but also setting up the fu-
ture, it is worth wondering whether the relationship between the 
two ways of thinking might shift, or might already have shifted.  
In recent times, the Supreme Court opinion that most thoroughly 
nails the analytic difference Schwartz is excavating here is Justice 
Scalia’s concurrence in Raich, as Schwartz recognizes.25  Unlike 
the Court majority, which regarded congressional authority to 
prohibit the growing of medical marijuana as within the com-
merce power,26 Scalia located the relevant provision of law firmly 
under the Necessary and Proper Clause.27  And at least as much 
as any Justice, it was Scalia who understood the limiting potential 
of deeming exercises of power to occur under the Necessary and 
Proper Clause rather than under clauses with their own substan-
tive content, because a non-deferential Court will make up its own 
mind about whether a given action is “improper.”  (Shutting down 
medical marijuana was proper, but directing sheriffs to do back-
ground checks was not.28)  So as long as the judiciary remains 
willing in Commerce Clause cases to respect formal jurisdictional 
hooks like the one in the reenacted Gun Free School Zones Act,29 
federal legislation might find safer haven in substantively obtuse 
formalisms deployed within the Gibbons paradigm than in the 
world of normative judgment that awaits under the Necessary and 
Proper Clause.  And in the highest-stakes cases, one might be 
skeptical that the choice of doctrinal framework will matter.  Per-
haps the decision will depend, as someone once said, “on a 
25. See id. at 243.
26. See Raich, 545 U.S. at 5 (identifying the question presented as one about the scope
of the commerce power). 
27. Id. at 34-35 (Scalia, J., concurring).
28. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 923-24, 933 (1997); cf. Richard A. Pri-
mus & Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Suspect Spheres, Not Enumerated Powers: A Guide for Leav-
ing the Lamppost 15-17 (unpublished manuscript),  [https://perma.cc/CR6G-AP5E] (ex-
plaining the use of the Necessary and Proper Clause as a vehicle for substantive, extra-textual 
judgments limiting congressional power). 
29. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (2015).
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judgment or intuition more subtle than any articulate major prem-
ise.”30 
The largest potential impact of this book, then, does not flow 
from its perspicacious reconstruction of this or that doctrinal 
framework, whether in the modern jostling between Gibbons and 
McCulloch or in its treatment of nineteenth-century struggles over 
the scope of implied powers—though those would be enough to 
make the book worth reading.  It is rather a matter of the book’s 
gestalt capacity to contribute to the potential reshaping (Schwartz 
might say correcting) of the big-picture constitutional worldview 
that law students absorb.  If readers come away with the sense 
that constitutional authorities (judicial and otherwise) have been 
read in cramped ways in order to avoid letting Congress exercise 
the full sweep of power that the Constitution warrants, they will 
be moved incrementally toward Schwartz’s view of the spirit of 
the Constitution.  
30. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
